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‘What it is Like’ Talk 
is not Technical Talk 
Abstract: ‘What it is like’ talk (‘WIL-talk’) — the use of phrases such 
as ‘what it is like’ — is ubiquitous in discussions of phenomenal con-
sciousness. It is used to define, make claims about, and to offer argu-
ments concerning consciousness. But what this talk means is unclear, 
as is how it means what it does: how, by putting these words in this 
order, we communicate something about consciousness. Without a 
good account of WIL-talk, we cannot be sure this talk sheds light, 
rather than casts shadows, on our investigations of consciousness. 
The popular technical account of WIL-talk (see e.g. Lewis, 1995, and 
Kim, 1998) holds that WIL-talk involves technical terms — terms 
which look like everyday words but have a distinct meaning — intro-
duced by philosophers. I argue that this account is incorrect by 
showing that the alleged technical terms were not introduced by 
philosophers, and that these terms do not have a technical meaning. 
Keywords: ‘what it is like’; phenomenal consciousness; technical 
terms; Nagel. 
1. Introduction 
Philosophers commonly talk about phenomenal consciousness by 
engaging in ‘what it is like’ talk (‘WIL-talk’ for short). WIL-talk is the 
use of sentences (‘WIL-sentences’) involving phrases such as ‘what is 
it like’ and ‘something it is like’. But it is not obvious what we mean 
when we engage in WIL-talk, or how we mean whatever it is we 
mean: how, by putting these words in this order, do we come to talk 
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about phenomenal consciousness?1 Indeed some have argued that this 
sort of talk is nonsensical (Hacker, 2002), or involves saying some-
thing false or trivial (Snowdon, 2010). One popular account of WIL-
talk is that it involves technical terms — special terms which, 
although they look and sound like everyday words, in fact have a 
distinct meaning. David Lewis holds such an account: ‘“What it’s 
like” [is] ordinary enough — but when used as [a term] for qualia, [it 
is] used in a special technical sense’ (Lewis, 1995, p. 140).2 And so 
does Alex Byrne: ‘it is doubtful that “There is something it’s like for 
so-and-so to φ” has some “special use to describe subjectivity” 
(dialects of analytic philosophy aside)’ (Byrne, 2004, p. 215). 
The meaning of these technical terms, according to the technical 
account, is such that we can use WIL-talk to talk about consciousness. 
Thus (as Janzen, 2011, argues) we can sidestep the arguments of 
Hacker and Snowdon — which concern non-technical, everyday 
language — and continue to use WIL-talk as we currently do. In this 
paper, I will show that the technical account of WIL-talk is false: 
WIL-talk does not involve technical terms. 
We should care what the correct account of WIL-talk is because of 
the widespread use of this talk in discussions of consciousness. We are 
interested in consciousness for many reasons: it plays a central, sig-
nificant, and immediate role in our lives, is a (perhaps the) significant 
mark of the mental, and is often taken to be the main obstacle to 
attempts to naturalize the mind. WIL-talk is used to define conscious-
ness: ‘phenomenal consciousness is the property mental states, events, 
and processes have when, and only when, there is something it is like 
for their subject to undergo them, or be in them’ (Kriegel, 2006, p. 
                                                          
1  Henceforth I will usually drop the ‘phenomenal’ qualifier: all references to conscious-
ness are to phenomenal consciousness. For a characterization of phenomenal conscious-
ness, see the examples of WIL-talk quoted in this section. 
2  We might interpret Lewis as claiming here that it is only when we use the phrase ‘what 
it’s like’ as an alternative to — i.e. as something like a synonym of — ‘qualia’ that the 
former is technical. But I don’t think we should understand him in this way. Directly 
after the sentence quoted, Lewis says: ‘You can say what it’s like to taste New Zealand 
beer by saying what experience you have when you do, namely a sweet taste. But you 
can’t say what it’s like to have a sweet taste in the parallel way, namely by saying that 
when you do, you have a sweet taste!’ This seems to be offered as support for the claim 
that ‘what it’s like’ is a technical term. It’s unclear what the argument is here, but what 
is clear is that ‘what it’s like’ is not being used as a synonym for ‘qualia’ (replacing 
‘what it’s like’ in the passage with ‘qualia’ doesn’t result in grammatical sentences, let 
alone synonymous ones). Instead it is being used in the way we are interested in. This 
suggests that Lewis holds the technical account. 
 52 J.  FARRELL 
 
58).3 It is used to make statements about consciousness: ‘We all know 
what it is like to undergo the visual experience of bright purple, the 
feeling of fear, or the sensation of being tickled’ (Tye, 2009, p. 137), 
‘there is nothing it is like to be a zombie’ (Chalmers, 2010, p. 107). 
And it is used to ask questions about consciousness: ‘What is it like to 
be a bat?’ (Nagel, 1974), ‘What is it like to think that p?’ (Pitt, 2004).4 
Simply put, it is rare for philosophers to talk about phenomenal con-
sciousness without engaging in WIL-talk. 
Given the ubiquity of WIL-talk in discussions of consciousness, it is 
imperative that we have a good grasp of what we mean when we 
engage in it. If we’re not clear what we communicate by engaging in 
WIL-talk, then definitions, claims, and discussions will not be clear, 
and we will have no response to critics such as Hacker and Snowdon. 
Conversely, if we can get clearer about the meaning of WIL-talk, this 
may allow us to get clearer about the phenomenon that we talk about 
when we use it: consciousness. 
But what we communicate by engaging in WIL-talk is unclear. 
Consider, for example, the WIL-sentence: ‘there is nothing it is like to 
be a zombie’ (Chalmers, 2010, p. 107). If we take the standard mean-
ings of the words used, and combine them according to the apparent 
syntax of the sentence, Chalmers is saying that there is nothing that is 
similar to being a zombie. But this is not what he means. The whole 
point of zombies is that they are very similar to us indeed: in all ways 
but one — the phenomenal — they are just as we are. More generally, 
it is clear that WIL-talk is not concerned with similarity.5 When faced 
with any kind of talk, the default hypothesis is that it works in the 
standard way: what it means is given by the meanings of the words 
used and the syntactic relations between them. As we’ve just seen, the 
standard account of WIL-talk is false. This shows that we need a non-
standard account of WIL-talk if we are to be confident about what we 
mean when we engage in it, and if we are to have a response to critics. 
                                                          
3  This is the standard definition of conscious states typically endorsed by both philos-
ophers (such as Thomas Nagel, 1974, p. 436, and Michael Tye, 1997, p. 290) and 
scientists (such as Nicholas Humphrey, 2011, p. 7, and Christof Koch, 2012, p. 34). 
4  As the quotations just given suggest, paradigm examples of phenomenally conscious 
states include perceptions, bodily sensations, and emotions; whether there is cognitive 
phenomenology is a matter of debate. Phenomenally conscious creatures include 
humans and (probably) bats, but not (philosophical) zombies. 
5  This is widely recognized. See, for example, Nagel (1974, note 6, p. 440), Hacker 
(2002, p. 166), Lewis (2002, p. 282), Hellie (2004, p. 352–6), Lormand (2004, p. 318–
22), and Snowdon (2010, p. 17). 
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Perhaps the most popular account of WIL-talk amongst philosophers 
of mind is the technical account: WIL-talk involves technical terms, 
and it is because of the presence of these terms that we can use it to 
talk about consciousness. 
Establishing whether the technical account is correct is important. 
First, we might think that the real issue is not whether WIL-talk 
involves technical terms, but what philosophers mean when they 
engage in this talk.6 But we need to deal with the former topic in order 
to make progress on the latter. If we are to clarify what is communi-
cated when we use WIL-talk to talk about consciousness, we must 
know which instances of WIL-talk are the target of enquiry. If the 
technical account is correct, only instances which occur in philo-
sophical contexts are relevant. If it is incorrect, then since — as I 
show in §4 — non-philosophers also engage in WIL-talk to talk about 
consciousness, we need to investigate a much larger corpus of uses.7 
Focusing narrowly on only a subset of relevant uses is liable to lead us 
astray. This is so in just the same way that, if we aim to describe 
swans, focusing on only a subset of the relevant animals — those 
found in the northern hemisphere, say — will result in claims that are 
not true of swans in general — e.g. that they are all white. Estab-
lishing the truth of the technical account, then, is required to ascertain 
what it is that we are giving an account of. It is not a distraction from 
clarifying what philosophers mean when they engage in WIL-talk, but 
a part of this task. 
Second, if the technical account is correct, then what philosophers 
mean when they engage in WIL-talk is different to what non-
philosophers mean. Thus while ordinary WIL-talk is concerned with 
our intuitive, pre-theoretical notion of consciousness, technical 
(philosophical) WIL-talk is about something else. This need not be a 
problem — perhaps the philosophical use is a precisification of the 
ordinary use. But it is certainly something we should be aware of 
                                                          
6  This objection was put to me by an anonymous reviewer. 
7  The importance of the truth of the technical account to the question of what we 
communicate by engaging in WIL-talk is made apparent in Janzen’s (2011) rejection of 
the criticisms of WIL-talk put forward by Hacker (2002) and Snowdon (2010). Janzen 
asserts that philosophical WIL-talk is technical, and that since the criticisms apply only 
to non-technical WIL-talk, they miss their mark. If the present paper is correct, Janzen’s 
argument fails because his assertion is false. But if it were true, then his argument 
would succeed, and it would do so in part because of the relevance of the technical 
account to ascertaining what WIL-talk means. 
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given that it is with the pre-theoretical notion of consciousness that we 
are ultimately concerned. If the technical account is incorrect, on the 
other hand, then this kind of subject-changing is less likely to be 
occurring. 
The third reason why establishing the truth of the technical account 
matters is that it has consequences for current debates in philosophy of 
mind (the strategy I employ here is described by Tim Bayne and 
Michelle Montague, 2011, §3). There is currently much disagreement 
about which sorts of mental states are phenomenally conscious: 
whether there is something it is like to be in a cognitive state (a belief, 
say, or a desire), and whether there such a thing as agential or moral 
phenomenology (ibid.; Kriegel, 2015). A second debate concerns the 
contents of perceptual experiences: is there a difference in what it is 
like to see a pine tree depending on whether one is an expert at 
recognizing pine trees, or a novice who can’t tell one kind of tree from 
another (Hawley and Macpherson, 2011; Siegel, 2011)? If, as many 
claim, ‘There is nothing that we know more intimately than conscious 
experience’ (Chalmers, 2010, p. 3), it is surprising that these matters 
are controversial: surely we can answer them by simply examining our 
experiences. If WIL-talk involves a technical term then these disagree-
ments are explained. If the relevant technical term gets its meaning 
from being embedded in a particular theory of consciousness, then 
those with different theories may well mean different things when 
they use the term. Authors in these debates have different background 
theories of consciousness and so have different technical notions in 
mind when they engage in WIL-talk. Thus they talk past one another. 
This can be avoided if participants in the debates are more explicit 
about their background theories, or employ terms that are not theory-
laden. The truth of the technical account, then, has philosophical 
ramifications outside of our understanding of WIL-talk. 
2. The Technical Account 
The technical account of WIL-talk can be given as the conjunction of 
three statements: 
 TECHNICAL: WIL-sentences involve technical terms. 
 INTRODUCTION: These terms were introduced by philosophers. 
 MEANING: It is because of the special meaning that these terms 
have that we can use WIL-talk to talk about consciousness. 
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By a ‘technical term’ I mean a word or phrase whose meaning is 
peculiar to — or closely connected with — a particular trade, disci-
pline, or field of study. Some technical terms — such as ‘hadron’ and 
‘epiphenomenal’ — have no counterpart in everyday language. Others 
sound and look like ordinary words or phrases, but have a different 
meaning. For example, the technical meaning of ‘work’ in physics — 
which is concerned with energy transference — is distinct from that of 
‘work’ in everyday English — which is concerned with employment 
or effort. If WIL-talk involves technical terms, most plausibly they are 
of the second kind: as we saw above, on an everyday reading of WIL-
sentences they are concerned with similarity. 
It has been suggested to me8 that the technical account is obviously 
false and so is not worth refuting. But although most writers who 
employ WIL-talk are not explicit about how they understand it, there 
is evidence that many prominent philosophers of mind adopt the 
technical account, and so do not find its falsity obvious. We’ve 
already seen that Byrne and Lewis accept this view. Here are some 
more examples. David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson say that, 
‘Recent interest in [the knowledge argument] arises particularly from 
Thomas Nagel, “What is It Like to be a Bat?” (the title tells you where 
the phrase comes from)…’ (2007, p. 152). William Fish says that, 
‘Perceptual experiences are paradigmatically conscious experiences: 
they have a phenomenology or there is, in Thomas Nagel’s influential 
terminology (1979), something it is like to perceive’ (Fish, 2010, p. 2). 
P.M.S. Hacker (a critic of WIL-talk) says that, ‘the mesmerizing turn 
of phrase “there is something which it is like”, derive[s] from Thomas 
Nagel’s paper “What is it like to be a bat?”’ (Hacker, 2002, p. 160). 
And Jaegwon Kim says, ‘The use of the expression “what it is like” in 
connection with consciousness is due to Nagel’ (Kim, 1998, p. 181).9 
Despite its popularity, we should reject the technical account. This 
is because we have good reasons to doubt the truth of both TECHNICAL 
and INTRODUCTION. I will consider these reasons in reverse order. 
                                                          
8  I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
9  Peter Carruthers also holds what I’m calling a technical account, although he claims that 
WIL-talk is only ‘quasi-technical’ (2000, note 11, p. 14) (he doesn’t explain what he 
means by this). William Lycan (1996) says that WIL-talk is ambiguous. He does not 
hold a technical account, however, since he does not appeal to the presence of technical 
terms to explain how we can use WIL-talk to talk about consciousness. 
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3. Not INTRODUCTION 
We can see that INTRODUCTION is false by examining early uses of 
WIL-talk by philosophers. As is familiar, Nagel uses WIL-talk in his 
1974 article: ‘the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all 
means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organ-
ism… fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and 
only if there is something that it is like to be that organism — 
something it is like for the organism’ (Nagel, 1974, p. 436). 
T.L.S. Sprigge also engages in WIL-talk: ‘One is wondering about 
the consciousness which an object possesses whenever one wonders 
what it must be like being that object’ (Sprigge, and Montefiore 1971, 
p. 167). And B.A. Farrell uses WIL-sentences to talk about conscious-
ness even earlier: ‘When, for example, we look at a red patch, we all 
just know what it is like to have the corresponding experience’ 
(Farrell, 1950, p. 181). A slightly earlier example — from 1946–7 — 
comes from Ludwig Wittgenstein: ‘…I know what it’s like to see red, 
green, blue, yellow, I know what it’s like to feel sorrow, hope, fear, 
joy, affection…’ (1980, p. 19).10 The earliest example of a philosopher 
engaging in WIL-talk to talk about consciousness that I’ve found is in 
Bertrand Russell’s entry on ‘Philosophical Consequences of Rela-
tivity’ in the Encyclopaedia Britannica in 1926: 
In the four-dimensional space-time frame there are events every-
where… The abstract mathematical relations of these events proceed 
according to the laws of physics, but the intrinsic nature of the events is 
wholly and inevitably unknown except when they occur in a region 
where there is the sort of structure we call a brain. Then they become 
the familiar sights and sounds and so on of our daily life. We know 
what it is like to see a star, but we do not know the nature of the events 
which constitute the ray of light that travels from the star to our eye. 
(Russell, 1926)11 
The way that Russell, Wittgenstein, Farrell, Sprigge, and Nagel 
engage in WIL-talk lacks three features that we would expect to see 
were they introducing technical terms. First, none of them tells us 
                                                          
10  Nagasawa and Stoljar note that this was written in 1946–7 and that although the quoted 
fragment is in English the passage in which it is embedded is in German (2004, note 5, 
p. 25). 
11  As some of the quotations given in §2 show, it is commonly claimed that the relevant 
technical terms were introduced by Nagel. While it is clear that Nagel’s paper is 
responsible for popularizing the use of WIL-talk in academic discussions of conscious-
ness, it is just as clear that he was not the first person to do this. 
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exactly which terms are the technical ones.12 Technical terms are 
words or phrases that have a particular meaning within some 
discourse. It would be surprising if someone introduced a technical 
term without indicating which of the many words they use is the 
technical one. This would be especially surprising if the technical term 
had an everyday look- and sound-alike counterpart. But, as we saw 
above, the alleged technical terms in WIL-sentences are of this kind: 
unlike, say, ‘hadron’, we can’t tell that the alleged terms are technical 
simply because they are not found in everyday language. 
Second, none of these philosophers tells us what the alleged 
technical terms mean.13 What it is to be a technical term is to have a 
particular meaning: one that is distinct from that of the term’s ordinary 
counterpart (if there is one). It would be odd (and not very helpful) if 
these philosophers had introduced new jargon without indicating how 
this jargon was to be understood. 
Might the meaning be given non-explicitly — by ostension, for 
example, or by being embedded in a theoretical framework? The third 
feature of these early uses suggests not. Proficient language users can 
often work out the meaning of an unfamiliar term by making use of 
context and their general knowledge. And perhaps this occurs in the 
early philosophical uses of WIL-sentences that we’ve seen (although 
the disagreement about how we should understand WIL-talk described 
above suggests not). But giving meaning by ostension requires more 
than using the term in such a way that one’s readers can work out 
what is meant when one does — it requires an active attempt to 
communicate the meaning to one’s audience. Our writers do not do 
this: none of them even indicate that they’re using WIL-talk in a new, 
non-everyday, technical way. Instead they simply employ WIL-
sentences in a non-self-conscious manner, without drawing attention 
to the language they use. Similarly, giving the meaning of a term via 
its place in a theoretical framework requires making plain that such a 
framework is offered. Our writers do not do this, most likely because 
they are not giving a theoretical framework at all. 
To emphasize these points, contrast what these philosophers say 
when they engage in WIL-talk with what Nagel says when he does 
                                                          
12  Nor, as a rule, do proponents of the technical account. Lewis (1995, p. 140) is an 
exception. 
13  The same is true of most adherents of the technical account. Janzen (2011, p. 281) is an 
exception in that he gives the meaning of WIL-sentences. 
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introduce a technical term — ‘subjective character’. Immediately after 
the passage quoted above, Nagel says, ‘We may call this the sub-
jective character of experience’. Here Nagel indicates that he is intro-
ducing a technical term, tells us which term is technical, and — by 
using WIL-talk — tells us what it means. 
Given the way that Russell and others use WIL-sentences, it is not 
plausible that they are introducing technical terms. Thus we should 
reject INTRODUCTION, and so the technical account of WIL-talk. 
4. Not TECHNICAL 
Another reason for rejecting the technical account is that TECHNICAL 
is false: WIL-talk does not involve technical terms. We can see this 
when we acknowledge that there are many examples of WIL-talk 
being used to talk about consciousness that come from outside philos-
ophy (and outside specialist discourse in general), some of which 
precede early philosophical uses. Further, there are no differences in 
meaning between philosophical uses and non-philosophical uses. So 
the alleged technical terms used by philosophers have the same 
meaning as the non-technical terms used by non-philosophers: they 
are not technical terms at all. 
Before giving some examples, it’s worth distinguishing my argu-
ment against TECHNICAL from four others that might be offered. First, 
we might describe and defend a positive account of WIL-talk and 
show that it entails the falsity of TECHNICAL. But such an approach 
will only persuade those who accept the proffered account of WIL-
talk. My argument shows that, even without committing to any 
particular account of WIL-talk, we should reject TECHNICAL. 
Less demandingly, we might aim to show that — regardless of the 
details — the correct account of WIL-talk is (as Lycan, 1996, 
Lormand, 2004, and Hellie, 2004; 2007, have argued) a compositional 
one: i.e. one according to which the meaning of WIL-sentences is 
composed out of the meaning and arrangement of their parts.14 (Such 
accounts will tend to be non-standard because they hold that the 
syntax of, or words involved in, WIL-sentences are not as they first 
seem to be.) But the correct account’s being compositional is com-
patible with WIL-talk being technical talk. After all, the correct 
account of the meaning of ‘There are six types of quark’ is a 
                                                          
14  I’m indebted to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this argument. 
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compositional one. But, because ‘quark’ is a technical term, this (and 
all other ‘quark’-talk) is technical talk. 
A third argument against TECHNICAL is offered by Hellie (2004) and 
Stoljar (forthcoming). They note that non-philosophers both under-
stand WIL-talk and have engaged in it since the mid-1960s. This is 
correct, but it doesn’t go far enough: these facts are compatible with a 
technical account according to which technical terms were introduced 
some time before the mid-1960s — perhaps by Russell, Wittgenstein, 
or Farrell — and then spread outside of philosophy. My argument 
shows that such an account should be rejected. 
A fourth argument is given by Stoljar: if WIL-talk is ‘technical, one 
could reasonably worry that the notion of consciousness at issue… is 
technical too. But it is presumably of no interest that there is some 
technical notion of consciousness…’ (ibid., pp. 22–3). This argument 
fails for three reasons. First, a term’s being technical doesn’t 
guarantee that the related notion is technical. ‘Epistaxis’ and ‘tmesis’ 
are technical terms, but the notions of a nosebleed and of inserting one 
word inside another — ‘fan-bloody-tastic’ — are not technical ones. 
Second, even if the notion is technical, it doesn’t follow that it is of no 
interest — perhaps investigating the technical notion will lead to 
insights concerning the non-technical notion. Third, even if a technical 
account entailed that philosophers were discussing a problematically 
technical notion of consciousness, this would give us no reason to 
reject the account. Instead, it would give us reason to consider 
whether philosophers are talking about something other than con-
sciousness in the intuitive, pre-theoretical sense when they engage in 
WIL-talk. As noted earlier, it is not clear what we communicate when 
we engage in WIL-talk. Thus we can’t reject TECHNICAL by assuming 
that what is communicated is the same for philosophical and non-
philosophical WIL-talk. 
As promised, here are examples of WIL-talk being used in the way 
we are familiar with which come from outside of philosophy. The first 
is from 1891: ‘Neither does he know what it is like to be scorched by 
lightning, but he has experienced the shrivelling effects of unrequited 
longing’ (unknown, 1891, p. 541). A comparison is made here 
between what it is like to be scorched by lightning and the experience 
of undergoing unrequited longing. The latter is concerned with the 
subject’s conscious states, so presumably that is also what is of 
interest in the lightning case too. 
A second example comes from a translation into English (made in 
1912) of Anton Chekhov’s The Sea-gull: 
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Nina: And I should like to change places with you. 
Trigorin: Why? 
Nina: To find out how a famous genius feels. What is it like to be 
famous? What sensations does it give you? (Chekhov, 1912) 
Nina asks for the same information in three different ways, one of 
which involves a WIL-sentence. The other two ways ask about 
Trigorin’s feelings and sensations, so we know that it is Trigorin’s 
conscious states that Nina is interested in. 
Note that these examples give us further reason to reject INTRO-
DUCTION: both were published at least seventy-five years before 
Nagel’s paper and at least twenty-five years before Russell’s encyclo-
paedia entry.15 This means that the use of WIL-talk to talk about con-
sciousness was not an innovation of philosophers. 
The next example is from a newspaper description of a blind man: 
‘His great regret is that his normal sight at birth was too early to allow 
him to remember what it is like to see’ (unknown, 1938, p. 7). The 
fourth example is from 1969: ‘Drug-inspired psychedelic art tried to 
portray what it’s like to “see sounds” and “taste colors” while on an 
LSD trip’ (Cain, 1969, p. F17). Again, this is clearly concerned with 
(altered, synaesthetic) conscious states. 
A book review from 1987 shows WIL-talk once again being used to 
talk about the experiences of the blind: ‘His description of what it is 
like to “see” as a blind man is fascinating and inspiring’ (Kirsch, 
1987). Coming up to the present, in the last example I will give the 
writer tells us about his emotional state: he feels afraid (at the time, 
Gaza was the target of Israeli airstrikes). He then uses a WIL-sentence 
to ask about the conscious states of children in Gaza — about how 
they feel: ‘When I think of the future, I feel fear. I feel fear and I am a 
34 year old man. What is it like for the children who live here in 
Gaza? What is it like for their parents?’ (Damo, 2012). 
We’ve seen six examples of WIL-talk being used to talk about con-
sciousness that come from outside philosophy (and outside specialized 
discourse more generally). Some of these examples pre-date 
                                                          
15  It has been suggested to me (by an anonymous reviewer) that these examples are some-
how anomalous since they are ‘literary’ English. I haven’t found more prosaic examples 
of non-philosophical WIL-talk from this early period, but I suspect that this is because 
the sources that linguistic corpora of these periods rely upon tend towards the literary 
and the formal since these are the sources that have survived. But even if all early uses 
of WIL-talk were literary, that wouldn’t show that they are technical, philosophical 
uses. And that is what matters here. 
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philosophical uses, while others are contemporary with them. The use 
of linguistic corpora or internet search engines will allow the reader to 
find many more examples. These non-philosophers use WIL-
sentences to talk about the conscious states associated with bodily 
sensations, perceptions, and emotions just as philosophers do. There is 
no difference in meaning — in precision, in scope, or in nuance — 
between these non-philosophical examples and the WIL-talk philos-
ophers engage in. So whatever meaning the alleged technical terms 
employed in WIL-talk have, it is the same meaning that their every-
day, non-technical, look- and sound-alike counterparts have. But an 
alleged technical term that means the same as its everyday counterpart 
is no technical term at all. Thus we should reject TECHNICAL. 
Before concluding, I’ll consider two objections to my argument 
against TECHNICAL. The first goes as follows.16 It’s true that philos-
ophers and non-philosophers alike use sentences of the form ‘What it 
is like to…’ to talk about consciousness. But what is not true is that 
the ellipsis is filled in in the same way by philosophers and non-
philosophers. My response is that, if we look at the examples I’ve 
given (and at others that can be easily found), it looks as if the ellipsis 
is filled in in the same way by philosophers and non-philosophers 
alike: both are concerned with what it’s like to see, for example, or to 
undergo an emotion. But perhaps all the objector needs is that some 
ways philosophers fill in the ellipsis are not ways non-philosophers 
complete the sentence. To make the objection concrete, let’s imagine 
that the claim is that philosophers sometimes talk about what con-
scious states (or qualia) are like, while non-philosophers only talk 
about what the world is like (cf. Lycan, 1996, p. 77; Carruthers, 2000, 
pp. 127–8). 
Even if this claim is true, it doesn’t show that philosophical and 
non-philosophical WIL-talk differs in meaning in a way relevant to 
my argument. It is no surprise that, when φ and ψ differ in meaning, 
so too do ‘What it is like to φ’ and ‘What it is like to ψ’.17 And that the 
meanings differ is no reason to think that one involves a technical 
term that the other does not. (It might be that one of φ or ψ is, or 
involves, a technical term, of course. But if so, this doesn’t shed light 
on facts about meaning particular to ‘what it is like’-talk.) To make 
the point by way of an analogy: both government economists and 
                                                          
16  Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this to me. 
17  Likewise for ‘what α is like’ and ‘what β is like’. 
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‘ordinary’ people are interested in claims about cost. But while the 
economists might be interested in the cost of some military hardware, 
or how much a tax cut will cost the state, ordinary folk might be con-
cerned with more mundane matters: how much a laptop, or a pint of 
milk, costs. But this doesn’t show that ‘cost’ or ‘what it costs’ is being 
used to mean different things by the two groups and so it gives no 
support to the idea that economists’ ‘cost’-talk is technical while that 
of ordinary people is not. 
The second objection is that we might say that, when philosophers 
engage in WIL-talk to point to characteristically philosophical prob-
lems, they are engaged in technical talk, even though what they mean 
is no different to what non-philosophers mean when they engage in 
WIL-talk.18 The suggestion here is that there is a sense of ‘technical’ 
(different to the one defined above) according to which a term is 
technical if it plays a central role in pointing to a philosophical (or 
other technical) puzzle, even if the term means the same as it does 
when used in other ways. We can, of course, use ‘technical’ in this 
way if we want to, but whether a term is technical in this sense does 
not bear upon what is communicated or meant when we use it: it 
means the same as it does when used in other circumstances. The 
reason why we are interested in whether WIL-talk is technical is 
because we want to get clearer about what is communicated when we 
use WIL-talk. That WIL-talk is technical in this alternative sense 
doesn’t shed light on this issue. 
5. Conclusion 
To summarize the evidence against the technical account: when we 
look at early uses of WIL-sentences in the consciousness literature, we 
do not find what we would expect to find if writers were introducing 
— or even just making an early use of — technical terms. These 
authors don’t indicate that they’re using technical language, don’t tell 
us which terms are technical, and don’t tell us what special meaning 
the technical terms have. Further, we find non-specialists using WIL-
talk to talk about consciousness before we find specialists doing this. 
Thus we should reject INTRODUCTION. And what non-specialists mean 
when they engage in WIL-talk is no different to what specialists — 
philosophers and scientists — mean when they engage in it. This 
                                                          
18  This objection was suggested by an anonymous reviewer. 
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shows that TECHNICAL is false. Since two of the three statements that 
make up the technical account of WIL-talk are false, we should reject 
it. 
Why is the technical account so popular if, as I’ve argued, the 
evidence against it is so compelling? I think three facts are relevant 
here. First, the correct account of WIL-talk is not the standard account 
— what we mean when we utter WIL-sentences doesn’t follow 
straightforwardly from the standard meanings of the words we use and 
the (apparent) syntax of the sentences. Second, the ubiquity of WIL-
talk in specialist discussions of consciousness is due to the success of 
Nagel’s 1974 paper: language that is commonly used in discussions of 
consciousness after this date was not so frequently used before this 
date. The technical account purports to explain both of these facts: the 
standard account fails, it says, because WIL-talk involves technical 
terms, and we don’t find it much before 1974 because that is when the 
technical terms were introduced. The third fact is that there has not 
been much investigation of WIL-talk: of what it means or of how it 
means what it does. Thus the prima facie plausibility of the technical 
account has often gone unchallenged. It’s not surprising that this 
account is popular even though, once we consider the issue more 
carefully, we can see that it is false. 
The aim of this paper has been negative: to show that we should not 
accept the technical account of WIL-talk. But, if successful, it shows 
the need for future, positive work. WIL-talk is important because of 
its widespread and central use in discussions of consciousness. But 
what we mean when we engage in WIL-talk is obscure, and some 
have argued that this talk should be abandoned. We cannot simply 
assume that by engaging in WIL-talk we are shedding light, rather 
than casting shadows, on the object of our investigations: conscious-
ness. Rather, we need an explanation both of what we communicate 
when we engage in WIL-talk, and of how we do this. Providing such 
an account will make it less likely that we talk past one another, lack 
clarity, or (if critics of WIL-talk turn out to be correct) utter false-
hoods, trivialities, or nonsense. But an account of WIL-talk also has 
the potential to provide positive benefits: it may allow us to be clearer 
both about the content of claims and arguments concerning conscious-
ness, and about how we should respond to these claims and 
arguments. 
Accounts of WIL-talk are available which are neither standard nor 
technical. For example, perhaps the talk involves idioms (Sprigge, 
1998, seems to think this), or perhaps the context of use determines 
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whether WIL-talk is phenomenal or not (Hellie, 2004, claims this — 
although he later recants (2007) — as do Snowdon, 2010, and Stoljar, 
forthcoming), or perhaps WIL-sentences are ambiguous. But none of 
these accounts has been described in detail and subjected to a 
sustained examination — mainly because discussions of WIL-talk, 
when they occur at all, tend to only occur in passing. There is, as yet, 
no consensus about how to understand WIL-talk. More work on this 
topic is needed.19 
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